Government decides to scrap Section 309 of IPC

Government decides to scrap Section 309 of IPC & Decriminalizes attempt to suicide


Government in the Parliament has announced that the attempt suicide will no longer be a crime. In this regard, government has decided to delete Section 309 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) from the Statute book which deals with attempt of suicide as per recommendations of 210th Law Commission report.

18 states and four Union Territories also have backed government on this move.

It was announced by the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Haribhai Parathibhai Chaudhary, in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha.

Current Section 309 of IPC A person who survives a suicide attempt is punished with a one-year jail term and a fine under a rule in the IPC.

Earlier in August 2014, the process of decriminalizing suicide was undertaken by government and all states were asked to give their opinion, as they have jurisdiction over it (as law and order is a state subject under Schedule VII of Constitution).

Even 210th Law Commission report had mentioned that attempting suicide is the “manifestation of a diseased condition of mind” that needs treatment and care rather than punishment.

In 2012, World Health Organization (WHO) has listed India as one of the countries with the highest suicide rates – 21.1 per 100,000 people. Now as a result of this decision, an attempt to suicide will not be taken as a criminal offence.

Merely adding a suffix to a popular name can't be the basis of a new trademark

[Kamani Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd vs. Bhuwaneshwar Refineries Pvt. Ltd., Notice of Motion No. 139 of 2014, decided on May 9, 2014]


Merely adding a suffix to a popular name can't be the basis of a new trademark


Bombay High Court:

In a case of alleged infringement of a trademark, a bench comprising of  SJ Kathawala, J granted an interim injunction restraining a firm from marketing an edible oil brand on the grounds that the name was similar to an established product.

The court said that merely adding a suffix to a popular name can't be the basis of a new trademark. In the present case, the plaintiff had acquired registration of the trademark ‘RISO’ in 2012.

The plaintiff alleged that the impugned trademark ‘RISO-LITE’ of the defendant was deceptively similar to its mark ‘RISO’. The Counsel for the defendant argued  that ‘RISO’ was an Italian name for rice and hence it was descriptive in nature and can be freely used by anyone.

The Court however rejected this contention stating though it is true that certain words are often borrowed from a foreign language and commonly used in India but ‘RISO’ is not one such word which is commonly used in India, and cannot be held as descriptive in the Indian context.

The defendant further contended that the plaintiff had not honestly adopted and conceived the said trademark ‘RISO’ since there were other marks, already using the word ‘RISO’, existing in the market, namely “RISONA” and “RISOLA”.

However, the court held that the defendant in the present case has not been able to show that the prior marks ‘RISONA’ or ‘RISOLA’ have actually been used or that they have a reputation or market of their own and thereby granted interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff.

Death of the owner of the vehicle is not a ground to evade the liability of the Insurer

[United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Brijbala, 2015 SCC OnLine HP 576, decided on 20.3.2015]

Himachal Pradesh High Court-

Considering the appeal with regard to grant of compensation to the claimants, a bench of Mansoor Ahmad Mir CJ, dismissed the appeal and held that the rights of victims of vehicular accidents cannot be defeated on flimsy grounds and the courts should not succumb to the procedural wrangles and tangles, technicalities and mystic maybes which in any way defeat the rights of the claimants.

The Court observed that the aim and object of granting compensation is for the benefit of the victims/ persons, from whom the source of dependency has been taken away and who have lost their source of income and are deprived of the love and affection and hope of future because of the death of their kith and kin.

The Court further noted that the Courts or the Tribunals have to decide such matters as early as possible, that too, summarily in terms of the mandate of Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which provides mechanism to determine claim petitions and appeals. The Court also laid great emphasis on Sections 146, 155, 169, 176 of the MV Act and through a series of leading judgments discussed the necessity of insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks.

In the instant case, the deceased was the victim of a vehicular accident caused by Respondent 1(owner/driver who died and whose name was struck off the Order). The claimants hence filed a claim petition for grant of compensation. Appellant-insurer resisted the claim petition and the award by the Tribunal, hence this petition.

On the issue of abatement of the claim petition in view of death of Respondent 1 raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, Ashwani K. Sharma, the Court held that the appeal had not abated on the failure to bring the legal representatives of the deceased owner on record. The claimants in the present case were represented by learned counsels, Sanjeec Kuthiala & Ms. Ambika Kotwal.

Section 66A of the IT Act unconstitutional and untenable.

What is Section 66A of the IT Act?

Section 66A defines the punishment for sending “offensive” messages through a computer or any other communication device like a mobile phone or a tablet. A conviction can fetch a maximum of three years in jail and a fine.


In a milestone judgment, the Supreme Court of India on 24 March 2015 struck down the Section 66A of the Information and Technology Act 2000 and  termed  it unconstitutional and untenable. The court maintained that it was a violation to free speech, a breach of the fundamental right granted to us citizens by the Constitution of India.


While the primary interest was to prevent slandering and abusing online, the Act turned out to be a tool to crush public voice & opinion and even harmless humour by state governments and establish terror and force their superiority amongst the masses.

SC in its ruling held that Section 66A interferes with freedom of speech and expression envisaged under Article 19 of Constitution of India and also hit the root of two cardinal pillars of democracy liberty and freedom of expression.

This verdict was given by SC bench comprising of Justices J. Chelameswar and R.F. Nariman on bunch of petitions filed in the wake of misuse of the penal provision by government authorities. Supreme Court held that Section 66 A is unconstitutional because it failed two major tests, the clear and present danger test and the tendency to create public disorder test.

Language used in this section is vague and nebulous does not properly define words like offensive or even persistent. SC also rejected the assurance given by NDA government during the hearing defending certain procedures of the law so it cannot be question and abused. However in this ruling SC did not strike down two other provisions in sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act and mentioned that they can remain enforced with certain restrictions.

Background The first petition in this regard was filed in 2012 by a law student Shreya Singhal who had challenged the Section after two young women were arrested for posting comments Facebook in Thane district. In the comments they had criticized shutdown in Mumbai following Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackray’s death.

About Section 66A of IT Act 2000 It gives power to government authorities to issue directions to block public access of any information through any computer resource. It also allows authorities to arrest a person for posting allegedly offensive content on websites and imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2015

Parliament has passed the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Bill, 2015.
It was first passed in Lok Sabha on 3 March 2015 and later
in the Rajya Sabha on 11 March 2015.

The Bill seeks to amend the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and replace the ordinance promulgated in this regard. The ordinance was promulgated in January 2015 after the bill was not able to pass in the winter session of Parliament.



Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2015 received the assent of the President on 19-03-2015. The objective of the Act is to further amend the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and replace the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015.

The Act provides for following amendments in the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988:

    Insertion of a new Section 2A, which brings e-carts and e-rickshaws under the ambit of Motor Vehicle Act, and provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply to e-carts and e-rickshaws as well.

The Section further defines “e-cart or e-rickshaw” as ‘a special purpose battery powered vehicle of power not exceeding 4000 watts, having three wheels for carrying goods or passengers, as the case may be, for hire or reward, manufactured, constructed or adapted, equipped and maintained in accordance with such specifications, as may be prescribed in this behalf’.


Amendment in Section 7 the Bill exempts drivers of e-rickshaw and e-cart from the requirement of learner’s licence to drive.

  
Amendment in Section 9 so as to provide that notwithstanding anything contained in this section for grant of driving licence, the driving licence to drive e-cart or e-rickshaw shall be issued in such manner and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed in the Act.

    Amendment in Section 27 in order to empower the Central Government to make rules with respect to specifications relating to e-carts and e-rickshaws, as well as the manner and conditions subject to which the driving licence for e-carts and e-rickshaws may be issued.

-Ministry of Law and Justice.

Lawmakers asked to scrutinize the sentencing policy under Section 304A IPC

Section 304A in The Indian Penal Code

 304A. Causing death by negligence.—Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
[ State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278,
decided on 30.03.2015]
Supreme Court:

Showing immense anguish over the disreputable record of road accidents in India, the bench of Dipak Misra and P.C. Pant, JJ asked the lawmakers to scrutinize, re-look and re-visit the sentencing policy in Section 304A IPC.

In the present case, the 2 people had died as an outcome of the rash and negligent driving of a motor vehicle by the respondent. The Punjab and Haryana High Court had reduced the 1 year imprisonment to 24 days i.e. the period already undergone during the trial upon payment of compensation by the respondent.

Terming this reduction of sentence to be a mockery of justice, the Court held that the said decision by the High Court was taken absolutely in the realm of misplaced sympathy and that such a crime blights not only the lives of the victims but of many others around them and ultimately shatters the faith of the public in judicial system. Hence, it was held that the one year imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court should be reduced to 6 months and that the respondent be taken into custody forthwith to suffer the remaining period of sentence.

Quoting the words of Sophocles that “Law can never be enforced unless fear supports them”, the Court said that the non-challan drivers feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey” and that in such cases deterrence is an imperative necessity.

Stating that life to the poor or the impecunious is as worth living for as it is to the rich and the luxuriously temperamental, it was further said that neither the law nor the court that implements the law should ever get oblivious of the fact that in such accidents precious lives are lost or the victims who survive are crippled for life which, in a way, worse than death.

Distinction drawn between “expiry date” and “best before date”

[M/S. Amrut Distilleries Ltd. v. The Authorized Officer, FSSAI, 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 321, decided on 19.03.2015]

Madras High Court:

While discussing the issue that whether “expiry date” and “best before date” are similar as contended by the petitioner in the present case, the bench of Vaidyanathan, J. observed that there is a clear distinction between the two terms. While “expiry date” means the end of estimated period under any stated storage conditions, after which product probably will not have the quality and safety attributes normally expected by the consumers;

whereas “best before date” means the period during which the product shall remain fully marketable and shall retain specific qualities for which tacit or express claims have been made. The Court further added that Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labeling) Regulations, 2011 has clearly drawn the distinction between the terms.

The case before the Court was that one of the food items imported by the petitioner did not meet the labeling requirements of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 as the expiry date and the best before date for the product was same, whereas the Guidelines by the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) state explicitly that the two dates should be different and clearly specified.

Counsel H.R Krishnan appearing for the petitioner argued that as per the requisites of Rule 2.2.9 of 2011 Regulations, only the date of manufacture and best before date is required to be furnished. K. Surendranath appearing for the respondents put forth that there is a distinction between “best before date” and “expiry date” and in view of this distinction FSSAI issued Guidelines dated 24.01.2013 directing that in case of wholesale packages which contain both “best before date” and “expiry date”, they should be different and not same.

The Court after a detailed analysis of the concerned provisions, observed that when there is a is clear distinction between “expiry date” and “best before date” then the petitioner cannot be allowed to mention a single date for both as it would mislead the consumers to think that the product will never lose its quality. The Court on perusing the petitioner’s contention of absence of a specific law prohibiting mentioning of a single date as the expiry date and best before date observed that, in presence of the FSSAI Guidelines such argument is misconceived.

Furthermore it was observed that there is no requirement to mention both '”best before date” and 'expiry date' and that a wholesale package can have either “best before date” or “expiry date”, but in case if the manufacturer intends to give both dates, then two dates should be different and clearly specified.

CALL FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES

The Hyderabad High Court has ruled that a court has the power to receive additional evidence only in exceptional circumstances and only when the court thinks that refusal to receive such evidence would result in failure of justice in a criminal revision case. Even the provision for receiving additional evidence in a criminal appeal has to be sparingly used by courts, the High Court has observed.

Justice R Kantha Rao passed this order while dismissing a revision petition filed by one Y Ram Naresh Naidu challenging the dismissal of his revision petition by the sessions judge of fast-track court at Narsapur in West Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh.

The sessions judge had held that the court of revision dealing with criminal revision petition can only examine the legality, propriety or correctness of the order sought to be revised and there is no specific provision in the CrPC permitting additional evidence in revision petitions and the revision petition was, therefore, not maintainable. The petitioner then approached the High Court challenging the lower court’s order.

As for the case details, the respondent wife filed a maintenance case before the judicial magistrate of first class, Palakol seeking maintenance of Rs 5,000 per month. The petitioner husband filed a counter stating that the respondent was not his wife and she had sufficient means to maintain herself and she had been working at a e-Seva centre earning Rs 3,500 a month besides having a building worth Rs 20 lakh.

After considering the entire evidence adduced on either side, the magistrate granted the woman maintenance at Rs 2,500 a month. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner husband filed a criminal revision petition before the additional sessions judge, Narsapur with a plea to issue summons to the bank manager concerned to produce the account particulars of the respondent wife. The sessions judge dismissed the petition by holding that there was no specific provision in the CrPC permitting additional evidence in revision petitions and, therefore, the revision petition was not maintainable. Then he moved the High Court challenging the said order.

Citing a judgment in Jaiprakash vs Rudra Prasad case, the counsel appearing for the revision petitioner husband said there is no provision in the code which prohibits the revisional court from receiving additional evidence.

After perusing the material on record and the judgments of various courts, Justice Kantha Rao observed that if the revisional court thinks that if additional evidence is necessary to do justice and also for proper adjudication, it can take additional evidence. In the instant case, both parties let in evidence in the maintenance case.

The revision petitioner husband contended that the respondent was not his wife but failed to prove the same and, thereby, the magistrate granted maintenance holding that the respondent was the wife of the revision petitioner. Later, the revision petitioner wanted to establish that the respondent had some means which would be revealed if the court examined her bank account, and some bank official was examined in that connection.

The judge is of the view that disallowing the petition filed by the revision petitioner seeking to adduce additional evidence is quite appropriate and the said order cannot be interfered with in the present criminal petition.

While dismissing the criminal revision petition, Justice Kantha Rao said, “Even if it is considered that the court of revision dealing with a criminal revision case has power to receive additional evidence, it must be under exceptional circumstances and only when the court thinks that refusal to receive such evidence would result in failure of justice. Even the provision for receiving additional evidence in a criminal appeal has to be sparingly used by the courts.

Therefore, receiving additional evidence in criminal revision case can be said to be very exceptional. The proceedings under Section 125 of CrPC are intended for affording speedy remedy to the wife to obtain maintenance from the husband. If in revision cases, the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced in a routine manner, it would cause undue hardship to the parties seeking maintenance and ultimately it defeats the very purpose underlying Section 125 of CrPC.”

Wife cannot oust her husband from the home on the ground that she pays EMI for the home loan

Wife cannot oust her husband from the home on the ground that
she pays EMI for the home loan

[Mrs S v. Mr A, decided on 12-02-2015].


Family Court, Mumbai:

Dealing as to whether a wife who pays EMI of home loan can oust her husband from the flat in dispute on the grounds which are daily wear and tear of a matrimonial relationship, a bench of P.L. Palsingankar J rejected the application of wife and refused to consider her prayer for injunction against the respondent.

In the instant case, the petitioner-wife filed an interim application with a prayer that the respondent-husband be directed to vacate the flat in dispute on the ground that the petitioner is paying EMI of the home loan and also alleged cruelty perpetrated on her by the respondent.

The respondent contended that the petitioner pays EMI for home loan but he incur monthly expenses of Rs 90,000/- towards family expenses, and if a relief in nature sought is granted then injustice would cause to him.

The Court found that the grounds mentioned by the petitioner in the application includes respondent forgetting keys of house while entering the house, not giving bath to child, leaving child in the car while purchasing snacks etc which are minor grounds which exists in every household.

The Court noted that “in a matrimonial household it becomes difficult to ascertain who has contributed how much while purchasing any asset or discharging any liability” and that “in modern times, both the spouses work, earn and acquire assets out of their earning”.

The Court relied on the words of Lord Denning that “when parties by their joint efforts save money to buy a house, then the proper presumption is that the beneficial interest belongs to both of them jointly.”

The Court held that “neither the spouse can assert their exclusive rights over any property which they jointly acquired by their own efforts after their marriage and therefore they cannot exclude each other unless the grounds mentioned in the application on which the said injunction is sought are grave and weighty”.

The Court noted that “the relief sought in this application is a relief which ought to have been asked as final relief and that a husband cannot be thrown away on the minor grounds at interim level” and accordingly rejected the application of the petitioner holding that the relief directing the respondent to vacate the premises cannot be granted in favour of the petitioner at this stage.

From - SCC

Property details, investments and assets can be accessed by one’s spouse under RTI

 Property details, investments and assets can be accessed by one’s spouse under RTI

(Prashansa Sharma v. Delhi Transco Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine CIC 258,
decided on February 3, 2015)


Central Information Commission (CIC):

“Though certain documents like annual returns of assets, investments, IT returns etc were earlier declared as private/ personal or third party information, as far as spouses are concerned they are not private or personal or third party information between them, in the context of marital disputes especially for maintenance purposes”, held CIC while directing Delhi Transco Ltd.

to provide property details, investments and assets of the husband, to an estranged wife and an alleged victim of domestic violence.

This order of CIC came upon an appeal filed by a woman engaged in matrimonial and maintenance dispute with her husband who was a government employee and she sought to know details of his property including that given in dowry and action details against her husband for attempting to commit bigamy, etc.

While rejecting the contention of Delhi Transco that income details of a person is "personal information", CIC referred to the judgments of Delhi High Court, Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6793, decided on 14th January 2015) and Puneet Kaur v. Inderjit Singh Sawhney, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3841, in which the court had asked both husband and wife to submit affidavits of income, assets and investments.

CIC further observed that depending on the financial conditions and non-availability of support from parents, when husband does not maintain his wife, it challenges her right to live, and thus information related to maintenance becomes life related information.

This information about assets, income and investments of spouses is no more private or personal information as against spouses, even if that information could be personal or private information as against any person other than spouse.

The proviso to Section 8(1)(j) read with Section 8(2) of the Right to Information Act entitled the appellant to get information which she sought because of overwhelming public interest in securing the lives of deserted wives.

So far, such information has been considered exempt under the RTI Act and treated as private or third party information. CIC also lashed the PIO and General Manager (HR) of Delhi Transco for suppressing the information and obstructing the furnishing of information to the appellant.


FROM - SCC

Husband is not bound to maintain a well qualified wife who is sitting idle and not working

Husband is not bound to maintain a well qualified wife
who is sitting idle and not working

[Firdos Mohd. Shoeb Khan v. Mohd. Shoeb Mohd. Salim Khan,
decided on 20.02.2015].


Family Court, Mumbai: Looking at the burden on the husband to provide maintenance to his wife even in cases where the wife is well educated and capable enough to earn for her living, a bench of S.A. Morey J gave a landmark judgment in favour of husband to curb the misuse of the provision of maintenance, and held that a wife who is well qualified and is capable to earn cannot sit idle and claim maintenance from her husband.

In the instant case, petitioner-wife moved an application before this Court for grant of maintenance from the respondent-husband during the pendency of petition under Section 125 CrPC.

The petitioner alleged that she was forced to live separately as the respondent and his family members ill-treated and harassed her for bringing less dowry.

The petitioner contended that the respondent is a successful businessman and is doing business not only in India but also in Dubai and other countries, and that his total income per month is more than Rs. 15 lakhs, and therefore considering the status of her husband, she prayed for grant of maintenance @ Rs. 2 lakhs per month.

Firstly, the Court rejected the contention of the respondent that the petitioner is not entitled to get maintenance as she is not legally wedded wife and that marriage between them was dissolved by way of talaq, and held that Section 125 CrPC itself has given definition of ‘wife’ which includes divorcee wife and makes clear that a Muslim woman who is either divorcee or who obtained divorce is entitled to get maintenance till her remarriage, and therefore respondent’s contention does not affect the right of the petitioner to claim maintenance.

Secondly, the Court observed that the petitioner is well qualified, has completed degree in Food and Science Nutrician, is Post Graduate in Dietician field, had worked as a dietician with an income of Rs. 50000 per month, and has experience of working with reputed companies like Larsen and Toubro etc but at present she is not working.

The Court relied on Mamta Jaiswal v. Rajesh Jaiswal, 2000 (3) MPLJ 100, where it was held that “well qualified wife is not entitled to remain as an idle and claim maintenance from her husband”.

The Court noted that the facts of the present case clearly shows that the petitioner is having good capacity to earn and therefore held that “the wife who is well qualified and claiming maintenance by sitting idle is not entitled to get maintenance”.

 Accordingly, the Court rejected the application filed by the petitioner.

From - SCC

Husband’s extra- marital relationship does not amount to cruelty

Husband’s extra- marital relationship does not amount to cruelty

[Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya v. State of Gujarat,
2015 SCC OnLine SC 137, decided on 18.02.2015]



Supreme Court: In the instant case, where the question arose that whether a husband’s extra-marital affair amounts to cruelty under Section 498A of IPC, the Bench of Dipak Misra and S.J Mukhopadhayay, JJ., observed that husband’s intimacy with another woman during the subsistence of marriage and failure to perform his marital responsibilities would not amount to cruelty, even though the evidences in the instant case point out towards an extra marital affair, the same cannot be termed as a form of mental cruelty of such a degree that would compel the wife to commit suicide.

The Bench further observed that extra- marital affair if proved would be immoral and illegal, but it would take a different character altogether if the prosecution proves that the accused person’s conduct is such that it drove the wife to end her life.

As per the facts of the present case, the wife of one of the appellant (Rakesh) had committed suicide, allegedly after coming to know about her husband’s illicit relationship with another woman, thereby leading to the appellants’ conviction under Sections 498A, 306, 201 and 114 of IPC.

It was argued by the appellants’ counsel Harish Raichura that the husband had already divorced the deceased before the suicide took place. The prosecution counsel Anurag Ahluwalia however contended that the husband’s extra- marital affair led to several arguments between them finally compelling the deceased to commit suicide.

The appellants were found guilty by the Sessions Court and were convicted; further the conviction was upheld by the Gujarat High Court.

Perusing the facts and arguments in the present case, the Court observed that the issue involved in the present case is that whether the extra marital affair was a cruelty of such nature by the husband that it compelled the wife to end her life and whether such a situation is covered under the ambit of Section 498A of IPC.

The Court on referring Section 498A of IPC and its decision in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 10 SCC 48, observed that if the extra- marital affair is of such nature, which is likely to drive the wife to commit suicide, then it would fall under the ambit of Explanation appended to Section 498A.

The Court further stated that in the present case the evidence produced did not establish a high degree of mental cruelty caused by the husband’s extra- marital affair so as to attract the provisions of Section 498A of IPC.   

From - SCC